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The ﬁgure of Ibn Taymiyya looms large within the tradition of Ḥanbalī legal thought.
Yet, the nature of his afﬁliation to this school of jurisprudence has long been a point of
contention in classical biographical literature with the opinion often expressed that
despite impressively attaining absolute status as a jurist, he remained closely aligned
with the school of Ḥanbalī law and its traditions of legal thought. Attempting to shed
light on the complexities which underpin Ibn Taymiyya’s relationship with this
school, the work under review not only assesses the substantial nature of his
contribution to the school’s legal discourse, principles, and methodology, but also
scrutinises key points of departure underlining the intricacies of his traditionalist
attitude towards the synthesis of the sources of Islamic law and their interpretation. In
the process the book provides a valuable digest of the history of the Ḥanbalī school of
jurisprudence in both its classical and modern contexts, outlining the major sources of
literature utilised within the school together with the theoretical framework within
which its orthodox credentials were forged. Despite the fact that Ibn Taymiyya is of
course renowned for his strict theological orthodoxy, with this text one gets a real
sense of the magnitude of his contributions to the ﬁeld of Ḥanbalī jurisprudence and
the rigour and authority with which this was determinedly accomplished.
The ﬁrst chapter in this text provides historical sketches of the lives of the two ﬁgures
whose legal legacies and thought lie at the core of this book’s focus: Ibn Ḥanbal
(d. 241/855) and Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328). Citing the traditional biographical
sources, Matroudi remarks that in his early career Ibn Ḥanbal studied with some of the
leading luminaries of the science of tradition (ahl al-ḥadīth) such as Hushaym (d. 183/
799), Sufyān ibn ʿUyayna (d. 198/814) and ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Ṣanʿānī (d. 211/826).
It is noted that he was trained in rational forms of juridical thought associated with
the so-called ahl al-raʾy (advocates of speculative reasoning in approaches to the
interpretation of law);1 traditional scholarship has identiﬁed this rational form of
juridical thought with luminaries of the Ḥanafī tradition such as Abū Yūsuf (d. 182/
798), with whom Ibn Ḥanbal studied jurisprudence and Ḥadīth (p. 6). Despite the fact
that a number of biographical reports mention Ibn Ḥanbal’s having committed to
memory some of the principal treatises composed by jurists afﬁliated to the ahl
al-raʾy, Matroudi mentions that he developed a preference for the ‘method of Ahl
al-Ḥadīth’, adducing the statement of Ibn Taymiyya who spoke of the fact that
‘although Ibn Ḥanbal was from al-Baṣra, he did not follow the method of this region
in studying law; rather he adhered to the method of Ahl al-Ḥadīth’ (p. 6). Referring
brieﬂy to the infamous episode of the miḥna from which Ibn Ḥanbal is commonly
viewed to have emerged as a champion of Sunnī orthodoxy, Matroudi argues that Ibn
Ḥanbal’s reputation as a scholar of distinction and a pillar of piety was established
well before this event.2
Matroudi next considers some of the arguments concerning the issue of whether Ibn
Ḥanbal was acknowledged among his peers as an esteemed jurist, which was a moot
point for some classical writers. Both al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/923) and, much later, al-Qāḍī
Īyāḍ (d. 544/1149) are reported as having viewed him as being principally a scholar of
Ḥadīth.3 Indeed, al-Ṭabarī’s seminal work, entitled Ikhtilāf al-fuqahāʾ, which offers a
miscellany of juridical views expressed by the leading jurists up to his age, included
none of Ibn Ḥanbal’s legal opinions.4 The view that Ibn Ḥanbal was not taken
seriously as a jurist has been touched upon within modern academic scholarship: Wael
Hallaq has alluded to the fact that Ibn Ḥanbal could hardly be said to have approached
the rank of individuals such as Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767), Mālik ibn Anas (d. 179/795),
and al-Shāﬁʿī (d. 204/820); and that this was accepted by many of his own key
students. Hallaq here cites a statement made by the Ḥanbalī jurist Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī
(d. 716/1316), who remarked that Ibn Ḥanbal was concerned exclusively with ‘Ḥadīth
and its collection’. Rejecting the inference that classical scholarship had dismissed
his importance as a jurist, Matroudi draws attention to the fact that notable
contemporaries who were acquainted with Ibn Ḥanbal’s scholarship, such as the
famous traditionist al-Nasāʾī (d. 303/915), spoke of his combining knowledge of both
traditions and jurisprudence.5 He argues that some classical scholars might have
entertained doubts about Ibn Ḥanbal’s status as a jurist due to the fact that he did not
author a speciﬁc work on jurisprudence, and claims that this created the impression
that he was not particularly concerned with the subject. Quoting from a statement by
Ibn Qayyim (d. 751/1350), who reports that Ibn Ḥanbal was utterly averse to the
authorship of books, Matroudi stresses that negative attitudes towards the authorship
of works were in the ascendancy among scholars of Ibn Ḥanbal’s traditionalist
persuasion.6
On a somewhat related note, the issues of literacy, orality and the transmission of
knowledge within the early Islamic tradition have been the subject of a number of
studies by Gregor Schoeler. He has made the point that, in the early years of the
Islamic tradition, the exclusively written word was not deemed to be an assurance of
authenticity as far as the transmission of knowledge was concerned, noting that
learning transmitted through the established lecture system by methods such as samāʿ
and qirāʾa was believed to be so much more trustworthy. Schoeler reasons that
Muslim scholars ‘perhaps even as late as the second/eighth and third/ninth centuries,
often did not give their work a deﬁnite, ﬁxed shape’.7 Interestingly, on the subject of
the well-documented aversion to the codiﬁcation of the Ḥadīth, which was apparently
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predominant in places such as Kufa and Basra, Ibn Ḥanbal did prefer scholars of
Ḥadīth to make use of written notes and aides-mémoires when transmitting traditions.8
On the other hand, his mentor, Hushaym, is reported to have said that those who do
not know the Ḥadīth by heart cannot be enumerated among the scholars of tradition.9
As Matroudi states, despite encouraging the use of written notes for the transmission
and preservation of Ḥadīth, Ibn Ḥanbal believed that ‘jurisprudential opinions should
not be recorded’ (p. 10).10 His belief was that this would foster a profound
appreciation of the founding ‘sources of legislation’. The suggestion is that such a
circumspect grasp of these sources could not be achieved simply through written
means; and therefore his not authoring a text on jurisprudence should not be used to
question his standing as a jurist. This stance does, however, raise the question of why
many among his contemporary peers did choose to compile legal works. Moreover, it
is probably the case that the controversy regarding Ibn Ḥanbal’s standing as a jurist
has its origins in the debates concerning attitudes towards the synthesis of law; indeed,
Matroudi himself has already emphasised the fact that Ibn Ḥanbal adhered to the
method of the ahl al-ḥadīth in his approach to jurisprudence. Nevertheless, as far as
Matroudi is concerned, the historical evidence shows that Ibn Ḥanbal’s status as a
jurist is indisputable. On the subject of the texts attributed to Ibn Ḥanbal, Matroudi
lists works such as the famousMusnad, Faḍāʾil al-ṣaḥāba and al-ʿIlal wa-maʿrifat al-
rijāl; he also mentions the Jawābāt al-Qurʾān and al-Radd ʿalā al-Jahmiyya,
although doubts remain regarding the ascription of this latter work.
In providing a brief survey of the historical foundations of Ḥanbalī jurisprudence,
Matroudi draws speciﬁc attention to the importance of the genre of masāʾil literature.
These masāʾil works preserved the panoply of legal opinions proffered by Ibn Ḥanbal
on various legal topics. Despite Ibn Ḥanbal’s own opposition to the practice of
recording his legal views and opinions, a number of his students went on to compile
such texts (p. 11). The genre was critical to the emergence of the Ḥanbalī school of
jurisprudence as the materials in these masāʾil texts were inductively poured over by
later scholarship and used to deﬁne the juridical methodology applied by Ibn Ḥanbal
in his approach to the scriptural sources.11 It has recently been stated that although the
masāʾil literature do not purport to be the very writings of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, they
‘seem much truer to life than books from other schools’.12 Scholars who collated the
legal opinions and discussions of Ibn Ḥanbal included al-Athram (d. 260/874), al-
Kawsaj (d. 251/865) and Ibn Ḥanbal’s sons, ʿAbd Allāh and Ṣāliḥ.13 Matroudi does
highlight the importance of the efforts of Abū Bakr al-Khallāl (d. 311/923) who
actually performed the task of collating the various masāʾil texts compiled by Ibn
Ḥanbal’s students. Hallaq’s observation regarding the accomplishments of al-Khallāl
is somewhat relevant to this discussion. He claims that Ibn Ḥanbal ‘had never
interested himself in law per se, and when he did occasionally deal with legal issues,
he did so in a marginal and tangential manner’.14 Hallaq insists that al-Khallāl
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‘essentially transformed Ibn Ḥanbal into the author of a methodologically cogent legal
doctrine that sustained all later doctrinal developments’. In his view the emergence of
the Ḥanbalī school represents a feature of ‘authority construction’, in which the
doctrines of the reputed founders of a tradition were ‘disassociated from those of their
predecessors, but also expanded to include the juristic achievements of their
followers’. Matroudi provides an entirely different perspective, contending that
although the efforts of al-Khallāl were critical to the formation of the Ḥanbalī
tradition, the deﬁnitive tenor of the legal discourse derived from Ibn Ḥanbal crucially
furnished the school with its own unique tradition; and this was reﬂected in both its
corpus of positive law and its synthesis of the principles of jurisprudence. To
underline this point he adduces the statement of Ibn Taymiyya who remarked that ‘al-
Khallāl was not thoroughly conversant with all of Aḥmad’s jurisprudential masāʾil’,
implying that the corpus of legal material bequeathed by the school’s eponym was
more extensive than hitherto perceived. Matroudi ends this section by reviewing the
historical spread of the school.
Turning his attention to Ibn Taymiyya and his place within the tradition of legal
thought, Matroudi notes that he came from a family of distinguished jurists: his
grandfather al-Majd and his father ʿAbd al-Halīm were both leading Ḥanbalī
luminaries. The political and social unrest which followed the Mongol invasions
resulted in the family leaving Ḥarrān and settling in Damascus (p. 15). Notably, Ibn
Taymiyya studied with scholars of all the predominant traditions of jurisprudence, but
it was during his youth that he was trained in Ḥanbalī legal thought. In this context,
Matroudi does mention that during these unsettled times, ‘intolerance and conﬂict
were common among the dominant religious schools of thought’ (p. 15). He also
refers to the fact that during the early years of his career, Ibn Taymiyya had excellent
relations with the ruling Mamlūks and his counsel was often sought by al-Nāṣir
(d. 741/1341) (p. 17). However, this state of affairs soon changed as he clashed on
theological issues with opponents who were often members of the judiciary and
inﬂuential state ofﬁcials. One particular clash with the authorities was triggered by Ibn
Taymiyya’s authorship of al-Risāla al-ḥamawiyya and a further text al-Risāla
al-wāsiṭiyya, in which rigorous defences of traditionalist approaches to dogma and
doctrine were set out (p. 18). These epistles censured the resort to ﬁgurative treatments
of dogmatic topics associated with Ibn Taymiyya’s theological opponents the
Ashʿarīs. The historical background of the issues at stake are not examined by
Matroudi, although he clearly stresses that in his writings Ibn Taymiyya continually
invoked an orthodox substrate which underpinned his own arguments. He also refers
to there being disagreements on a range of legal and ritual topics which helped fuel the
controversies and disputes between Ibn Taymiyya and his opponents. One of these
disputes stemmed from Ibn Taymiyya’s views on the religious legitimacy of visiting
shrines, while the other resulted from his arguments over the efﬁcacy of casual oaths
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and the practical status of the intended triple divorce, a matter which brought him into
conﬂict with his Ḥanbalī peers (p. 20).15 Matroudi tends to see the essence of the
antipathy between Ibn Taymiyya and his opponents as emanating not only from
disagreements concerning jurisprudence and theology but also because his stature as a
scholar aroused ‘a degree of envy and antagonism on the part of some of his
contemporaries’ (p. 20).16 This may well be the case, although it seems safe to
conclude that tensions resulting from differences concerning theological issues
between the Ashʿarīs and their traditionalist opponents do lie at the core of a number
of the controversies in which he was involved. The roots of this hostility have their
origin in the earlier tradition and represent an ongoing struggle for expressions of
orthodoxy within the conﬁnes of Sunnism.
It is no surprise that this course of events had such a dramatic impact upon the life of
Ibn Taymiyya even though, as Matroudi remarks, many of his distinguished
contemporaries were prepared to come to his defence. Included among them is the
esteemed Shāﬁʿī scholar Ibn Daqīq al-ʿĪd (d. 702/1302), and no less a ﬁgure than
al-Dhahabī (d. 748/1348), who, despite disagreeing with him on key issues, described
him as being an absolute mujtahid whose ‘mistakes should be excused’. With this in
mind, Matroudi categorically questions the authenticity of a treatise entitled al-Naṣīḥa
al-Dhahabiyya ilā Ibn Taymiyya, which al-Dhahabī is said to have authored criticising
Ibn Taymiyya (p. 22); Donald Little has argued that the ascription is reliable,17 a
conclusion he reaches in an article which uses al-Naṣīḥa al-Dhahabiyya to evaluate
the famous remarks of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa (d. 779/1377) regarding Ibn Taymiyya’s state of
mind.18 The rest of this chapter lists Ibn Taymiyya’s literary legacy, including works
in the ﬁeld of jurisprudence and uṣūl al-ﬁqh. Matroudi notes that al-Dhahabī spoke of
his authoring some ‘4,000 kurrāsa (small booklets) or some 5,000 mujallad
(volumes)’ (p. 24). Such proliﬁc authorship would seem to conﬁrm the extent of his
contribution to classical legal discourse in general, and more speciﬁcally the Ḥanbalī
school, although underpinning many of these compilations lies Ibn Taymiyya’s quest
for independent legal reasoning unshackled by loyalties to individual schools of legal
thought. Matroudi believes that this is reﬂected in the ethos which marked Aḥmad ibn
Ḥanbal’s own juridical methodology. This symmetry in legal perspectives would
seem to extend to both individuals’ attitude to theological issues.
The basic principles of Islamic law according to both Ibn Ḥanbal and Ibn Taymiyya
are the subject of a comparative study in Chapter Two of this book. Given that Ibn
Ḥanbal did not author a work outlining his own principles of law, it was the rich stock
of masāʾil compilations which were inductively probed by his students in order to
ﬂesh out and reconstruct the theoretical bases of his legal methodology. Thus, as early
as the third/ninth century scholars such as al-Athram were already attempting to
‘infer’ the general legal principles applied by Ibn Ḥanbal (p. 33).19 However, it is
the compilations of leading scholars such as Ibn Abī Yaʿlā (d. 526/1132), Ibn
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Tamīm (d. 675/1276) and Ibn Qayyim which are referenced by Matroudi for their
deﬁnitions of Ibn Ḥanbal’s uṣūl. Although Ibn Ḥanbal accepted the same sources
of law acknowledged by the other mainstream legal schools: namely, the Qur’an,
the Sunna, ijmāʿ and qiyās, Matroudi points out that among Ḥanbalī jurists there
existed stark differences regarding the precise identiﬁcation and classiﬁcation of
these sources of law, particularly as far as the concepts of consensus (ijmāʿ) and
analogical reasoning (qiyās) were concerned (pp. 36–8). The contentious point for
modern scholarship is the position taken by Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal on the authority of
analogical reasoning: Hallaq and Melchert maintain that Ibn Ḥanbal continued to
harbour reservations concerning the resort to this legal device despite countenancing
certain exceptions, and that he adopted an anti-rationalist approach to the
interpretation of law.20 Matroudi offers a more nuanced qualiﬁcation of Ibn Ḥanbal’s
attitude to such methodologies and concepts,21 and goes on, later in this chapter, to
demonstrate that Ibn Taymiyya was clearly of the view that the legal ethos of the
Ḥanbalī school of jurisprudence and its eponym was anchored to a thoroughly
orthodox treatment of the Qur’an and Sunna; moreover (pp. 41–3), it ﬂowed from
the uṣūl madhdhab al-Madīna (ahl al-ḥadīth). Matroudi argues that Ibn Taymiyya
applied the same methodological approaches to the sources of law adhered to by Ibn
Ḥanbal and therefore he was essentially a ‘dependent absolute mujtahid’, which,
within the hierarchy of distinguished Ḥanbalī scholars, places him among the ranks
of luminaries such as Abū Yaʿlā (d. 458/1066), Ibn ʿAqīl (d. 515/1119) and
Abū’l-Khaṭṭāb (d. 636/1236).
Matroudī is keen to point out that Ibn Taymiyya’s adoption of Ibn Ḥanbal’s
theoretical approach to the sources of law was not a result of slavish adherence to this
individual or indeed the legal school that developed around him. But, rather, it was
inspired by the view that in Ibn Taymiyya’s judgement, Ibn Ḥanbal’s methodology
had meticulously encapsulated the most orthodox approach to the interpretation of the
law and one with which the pious ancestors would have been in agreement. As
Matroudi notes, Ibn Taymiyya insisted that the Ḥanbalīs had ‘fewer disagreements
among themselves than those of any other schools of law’ (p. 41). Interestingly, even
at junctures in which Ibn Taymiyya found himself to be at variance with the school on
issues of interpretation, such differences were never viewed as being the consequence
of disagreements with the school’s eponym, but rather with later scholarship’s reading
of Ibn Ḥanbal’s position on given points of law and sundry methodological
procedures; or, that conﬂicting narrations on the authority of Ibn Ḥanbal utilised by
later scholarship lay at the source of this discord (pp. 48–9). Nonetheless,
disagreements with the opinions and rulings of Ibn Ḥanbal did occur. Matroudi
indicates that in such instances it was often the case that these differences resulted
from Ibn Ḥanbal’s being unaware of certain narrations on given subjects, while on
other occasions Ibn Ḥanbal could not have known that speciﬁcally cited traditions
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which he had relied upon were subsequently proved by scholarship to be
inauthentic.22
Revision and modiﬁcation play a signiﬁcant part in Ibn Taymiyya’s contributions to
Ḥanbalī legal thought both in the areas of uṣūl and positive law, and these areas are
explored in considerable depth in Chapters Three and Four. The rigorous nature of Ibn
Taymiyya’s scrutiny of the school’s legal methodology and discourse is reﬂected in
the criticisms he directed at al-Khallāl, whom he claimed omitted many of the masāʾil
ascribed to Ibn Ḥanbal (p. 56). One might add here the observation that, on the
contrary, Ibn Qayyim appeared to be of the view that as a result of al-Khallāl’s
endeavours only a little of Ibn Ḥanbal’s legal materials were lost.23 Other ﬁgures
singled out by Ibn Taymiyya include al-Khiraqī, who is said to have been the source
of incorrect rulings subsequently ascribed to Ibn Ḥanbal, and Abū Yaʿlā, whose legal
opinions were subjected to criticism by Ibn Taymiyya; additionally, the legal rulings
and statements proffered by luminaries from the later tradition were authoritatively
subjected to scrutiny. Matroudi’s key point is that a spirit of revision and clariﬁcation
determined Ibn Taymiyya’s contributions to Ḥanbalī jurisprudence. The fact that Ibn
Taymiyya was such an observant and perceptive authority on the legal sources and
principles of the school would appear to conﬁrm that the uṣūl ascribed to Ibn Ḥanbal
were more elaborate than hitherto recognised by scholars such as Hallaq: indeed, Ibn
Taymiyya does not seem to have questioned the efﬁcacy of the actual processes
through which Ibn Ḥanbal’s uṣūl were inferred. Topics highlighted by Matroudi to
exemplify Ibn Taymiyya’s appraisal of the school’s theoretical apparatus include
consensus; the use of weak traditions; the phenomenon of metaphor in language; the
mujtahid and issues of correctness and error; the division of the Sharīʿa along the lines
of uṣūl and furūʿ; comprehension of texts; Islamic law and the Arabs; maṣlaḥa; the
deﬁnition of raʾy; the postponement of the clariﬁcation of a ruling; issues pertaining to
taqlīd; and corrections of misunderstandings of other schools of law by Ḥanbalī
scholars.
Matroudi shows that many of the objections raised by Ibn Taymiyya apropos these
key theoretical issues were based on the view that Ibn Ḥanbal’s stance on such
subjects was misconstrued by later Ḥanbalī scholars. The claim by some Ḥanbalī
jurists that Ibn Ḥanbal permitted the use of weak traditions as a source of law is an
excellent case in point (pp. 59–60). Ibn Taymiyya contended that while Ibn Ḥanbal’s
sources of law do refer to the contingent use of weak traditions, the technical compass
of the term ḍaʿīf did not connote weakness in the technically derived sense that
marked the term’s usage in later Ḥadīth terminology. The argument is that prior to al-
Tirmidhī (d. 279/892), who introduced the terms ṣaḥīḥ, ḥasan and ḍaʿīf, scholars
divided traditions into ṣaḥīḥ and ḍaʿīf. Thus, Ibn Ḥanbal was referring to a different
category of tradition which would in effect be classed in the later tradition as being
ḥasan. Matroudi does then have to deal with the fact that a recent study has shown that
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the term ḥasan was used by Ibn al-Madīnī (d. 234/848), al-Bukhārī (d. 256/870) and
even Ibn Ḥanbal, however, he argues that ﬁne distinctions between the earlier and
later import of the term ḥasan do not impinge upon the validity of the arguments made
by Ibn Taymiyya (p. 61).
The incidence of metaphor in the language of Arabic is likewise an issue on which Ibn
Taymiyya claimed that Ibn Ḥanbal’s views had been misinterpreted. Matroudi
maintains that linguistic issues do have a signiﬁcant impact upon the manner by which
scriptural sources are interpreted in both legal and theological contexts. However, one
senses that the arguments which Ibn Taymiyya espouses on the subject of denying the
existence of metaphors in the language of the Arabs were principally driven by
theological as opposed to juridical imperatives. Discourse on the incidence of
metaphor, which had later become associated with obviating anthropomorphic
imagery predicated of God, appears to go back to Ibn Ḥanbal’s use of the term majāz
in the treatise which is ascribed to him entitled Kitāb al-radd ʿalā Jahmiyya wa’l-
Zanādiqa.24 Ibn Taymiyya seized on the fact that at that time when Ibn Ḥanbal used
the term majāz it did not connote metaphor: the early grammarians’ use of this term
conﬁrmed this much.25 Despite this fact, scholars such as Abū Yaʿlā, Ibn ʿAqīl and
Abū’l-Khaṭṭāb all referred to Ibn Ḥanbal’s employment of this term to sanction their
view that metaphors do occur in the Qur’an and the language of the Arabs. As
Matroudi shows, Ibn Taymiyya’s arguments regarding the import of this term,
particularly in the context of the technical terminology of Arabic linguistic thought,
are compelling, but one has to accept that later Ḥanbalī scholars did not revise their
position.26 Nevertheless, these sorts of examples illustrate the assiduousness with
which Ibn Taymiyya engaged in the treatment of topics of this nature. Deliberations
on the topic of metaphor belong to a protracted debate in which Ibn Taymiyya’s
contribution to the discussions forms a subsequent part of that discourse, and this is a
point that Matroudi underscores.27
On a somewhat related note, when considering whether it was permissible to divide
the Sharīʿa into uṣūl and furūʿ, a division rejected by Ibn Taymiyya but adhered to by
most jurists, Matroudi notes that this binary categorisation of the Sharīʿa is effectively
acknowledged by Ibn Taymiyya in a number of his later treatises (pp. 69–72).
Matroudi maintains that this possibly indicates that Ibn Taymiyya changed his opinion
on the subject, although he also acknowledges that there may have been practical
reasons for accepting this division: namely that Ibn Taymiyya felt it necessary to
entertain discussions on the subject with his peers whose writings were replete with
references to this epistemic category.28
While the previous chapter focused on Ibn Taymiyya’s contributions to theoretical
issues within the sphere of the principles of law, Chapter Four looks at ‘clariﬁcations
and corrections’ made by Ibn Taymiyya to both the corpus of Ḥanbalī ﬁqh and
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methodological conventions and terminologies adopted within the school. Matroudi
selects seven areas of law to illustrate the magnitude of Ibn Taymiyya’s contributions,
thereby underlining his status as a ‘dependent absolute mujtahid’. These include
innovation (bidʿa); ḥiyal (legal stratagems); the use of precaution and piety; incorrect
legal opinions; jurisprudential terminology; jurisprudential rules; and narrations.
Matroudi contends that such contributions demonstrate the resolve with which Ibn
Taymiyya was prepared to question his Ḥanbalī peers whenever he felt that their legal
opinions could not be reconciled within the spirit of legal orthodoxy deﬁned by what
he perceived was the authenticated Prophetic Sunna, a point emphasised throughout
this book. Matroudi provides us with some insightful glimpses into his general
philosophy: for example, when Ibn Taymiyya acknowledged that juridical
inaccuracies and inconsistencies existed in the corpus of Ḥanbalī ﬁqh, his resourceful
approach was to insist that these stemmed from opinions and doctrines which were
erroneously assimilated into the school’s legal discourse: they were therefore the
result of methodological and theoretical oversights by scholars who were under the
impression that they were operating within the general legal philosophy of the Ḥanbalī
school (pp. 93–4). This permits Ibn Taymiyya to contend that Ibn Ḥanbal was seldom
the source of juridical differences or indeed incorrect rulings (see p. 93, but also p. 109
and p. 126). As Matroudi demonstrates, the tenor of Ibn Taymiyya’s argument is
forthright: later Ḥanbalī scholarship had to be held to account for misconstruing
responsa and inaccuracies in the processes of ascribing legal views to Ibn Ḥanbal.
While reviewing the subject of innovation, Matroudi does emphasise the point that
according to Ibn Taymiyya its incidence was more prevalent in matters relating to acts
of worship as opposed to dogmatic issues, but that, equally, the Ḥanbalī school was
less prone to innovation than the other schools of jurisprudence (p. 94). A strict
attitude to the interpretation of the sources symbolised Ibn Taymiyya’s relationship
with the Ḥanbalī school and indeed the other traditions of jurisprudence. He was only
prepared to defend the school if its stance could be reconciled within the spirit of legal
orthodoxy championed by the pious ancestors. Accordingly, it was this spirit of
orthodoxy which had to be applied not only in assessing the sum and substance of the
legal teachings of the Ḥanbalī school of law but that of all the other schools. This
outlook is evident in Ibn Taymiyya’s criticism of the practice of physically
articulating intentions before acts of worship, a practice which a number of prominent
Ḥanbalī and Shāﬁʿī scholars sanctioned (p. 95f.). Perhaps this sums up the central
argument of this book: namely, that the central authority of the construct of
authenticated Prophetic Sunna was purposefully enshrined within the paradigmatic
legal framework developed by both Ibn Ḥanbal and Ibn Taymiyya; and, that this
construct governed both ﬁgures’ attitudes towards interpreting law.
The tenacity with which Ibn Taymiyya was prepared to champion orthodoxy is best
exempliﬁed by Matroudi’s discussion of the controversy which followed his issuing
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an edict on the subject of travelling for the purpose of visiting graves. Ibn Taymiyya
had made the case that if such visits sought to remind the believer of the reality of the
hereafter, they were unquestionably recommended, but to visit such locations with the
sole intention of venerating the graves of those buried there could not be justiﬁed. Ibn
Taymiyya adduced Prophetic dicta which expressly prohibited this practice and felt
that the act itself was tantamount to polytheism.29 Discussions regarding the
permissibility of visiting the Prophet’s grave were soon brought into the various
arguments (p. 97). Ibn Taymiyya regarded these visits as being equally reprehensible,
particularly if their select purpose was to seek benediction (al-tabarruk). The cudgels
of his arguments on this issue were enthusiastically taken up by Ibn Qayyim.30 Ibn
Taymiyya found himself in conﬂict with many of his jurist peers, including leading
Ḥanbalī scholars, and it was his position on this issue which was later used to secure
his detention. Matroudi argues that ideological opponents of Ibn Taymiyya certainly
exploited the episode to denounce him and his defenders. Classical biographical
literature is replete with accounts of this affair and its aftermath.31
Having shown that Ibn Taymiyya was prepared to criticise his Ḥanbalī peers for
approving of legal devices and concepts such as the use of ḥiyal and al-iḥṭiyāṭ wa’l-
waraʿ (‘precaution and piety’), Matroudi looks at the fascinating issue of incorrect
rulings which Ibn Taymiyya claimed were present in Ḥanbalī ﬁqh. Authoritatively,
Ibn Taymiyya was always able to explain why there existed such a large body of
conﬂicting opinions within the Ḥanbalī school (pp. 108–9). However, while the topics
chosen by Matroudi reveal the inﬂuence that Ibn Taymiyya was able to exert on the
various debates, to an extent, they also coincidentally show that a number of Ḥanbalī
luminaries were prepared to challenge consistently points of law which had been
defended by Ibn Taymiyya.32 The reference to the sale and replacement of
endowments provides an apposite example (pp. 113–4). Ibn Taymiyya took the view
that it was permissible to sell or replace endowments without taking into account the
aspect of yield; while Ḥanbalī scholars had stressed that replacing endowments was
only permissible in instances when the yield was unfruitful. The former view was
defended by a student of Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Qāḍī al-Jabal; but he was vehemently
criticised by the famous Jamāl al-Dīn al-Mardāwī (d. 769/1367), who stated that such
a ruling was contrary to the general principles applied within the Ḥanbalī school and
even composed a refutation devoted to the question (p. 114). Obviously, Matroudi’s
point is that the opinion outlined by Ibn Taymiyya, along with many other similar
revisions, was given currency within the later Ḥanbalī tradition as a valid perspective
of the school, which was certainly receptive to engaging in such discussions. The
chapter moves on to explore the jurisprudential terminology of the Ḥanbalī school;
jurisprudential rules; narrations attributed to Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal and shown by Ibn
Taymiyya to be incorrect; and, ﬁnally, actual narrations of Ibn Ḥanbal proved by Ibn
Taymiyya to be incorrect. The ensuing analysis conﬁrms that Ibn Taymiyya’s
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loyalties were not purely determined by the methodology, procedures and legal
rulings deﬁned by the Ḥanbalī school, but rather by an adherence to what he believed
to be an orthodox explication of the Qur’an and the Prophetic Sunna. It is in this
context that Ibn Taymiyya’s fastidiously rigorous attitude to the sources of law has to
be understood. Moreover, it also deﬁned his relationship with the Ḥanbalī school.
In Chapter Five of this text Matroudi reviews Ibn Taymiyya’s inﬂuence upon later
generations of Ḥanbalī jurists. The individuals selected by Matroudi to highlight the
extent of his inﬂuence within the later Ḥanbalī tradition are Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya
(d. 751/1350), Ibn Muﬂiḥ (d. 763/1362), al-Jurāʿī (d. 883/1478), al-Mardāwī,
al-Ḥajjāwī (d. 968/1561), Ibn al-Najjār (d. 972/1564), al-Karmī (d. 1033/1623),
al-Buhūtī (d. 1051/1641), Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb (d. 1206/1791), al-Saʿdī (d. 1376/1976)
and Ibn ʿUthaymīn (d. 1421/2000). Regarding the most prominent of Ibn Taymiyya’s
students, Ibn Qayyim, the case is made that despite the latter ﬁgure’s reverence for his
mentor and his view of him as being an outstanding scholar in the ﬁelds of theology,
Ḥadīth and law, he did not slavishly emulate his teacher when dealing with legal
discussions, a point also made by the Shāﬁʿī scholar and traditionist Ibn Ḥajar al-
ʿAsqalānī (d. 852/1449) (p. 134). Matroudi reasons that Ibn Qayyim adopted the same
analytical and independent approach to the synthesis of the sources of law advocated
by his mentor and, as a result of this, he was often in disagreement with Ibn Taymiyya
over a range of subjects (p. 135). Matroudi suggests that Ibn Qayyim was inﬂuenced
in his jurisprudence by other prominent scholars, although his relationship with the
Ḥanbalī school of law was very similar in nature to that of Ibn Taymiyya. Having said
that, Matroudi is appreciative of the fact that Ibn Qayyim does not cite his shaykh that
frequently, despite his evidently being inﬂuenced by him. The renowned Ibn Muﬂiḥ,
who played a signiﬁcant role in transmitting the legal legacy of Ibn Taymiyya, is
shown to have occasionally disputed opinions and rulings reached by Ibn Taymiyya
as well as questioning his use of proofs (p. 139). Indeed, on some issues he sided with
the views adopted by certain Ḥanbalī scholars against those of his mentor. Matroudi
reasons that such individuals were encouraged by Ibn Taymiyya to be independent in
their juridical thought as long as they honoured the authenticated sources of law
and applied valid approaches to their synthesis and exposition. His view was that
independent reasoning is obligatory for those who possess the skill and ability to
scrutinise the legal sources.33 Within the framework of ijtihād, if the ruling of a
scholar contravened incontrovertible evidence, then it had to be discarded. Even with
later ﬁgures such as Ibn Muﬂiḥ and al-Mardāwī, there was a tendency to quote
extensively the opinions of Ibn Taymiyya; yet, for these two scholars, his views do not
appear to have had an impact ‘upon their jurisprudential opinions’ (p. 169). Matroudi
concludes that the legal thought of Ibn Taymiyya became a major focal point for
Ḥanbalī scholars, particularly as far as it was used to evaluate conventional positions
on legal questions adopted within the school. Although it is interesting to note that,
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according to the tables of citation included in this chapter, during the fourth/tenth and
ﬁfth/eleventh centuries, Ibn Taymiyya’s opinions were not cited with the same
frequency by Ḥanbalī scholars, nevertheless over ensuing centuries his work and
thoughts enjoyed a resurgence, gaining greater currency in the writings of much later
Ḥanbalī luminaries. His approach to legal thought was enthusiastically accentuated
within the reform movement led by Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, although one
might add that this individual was inﬂuenced even more profoundly by the brand of
theological orthodoxy advocated by Ibn Taymiyya.
The ﬁnal chapter in Matroudi’s work provides an in-depth examination on the subject
of the ‘intended triple divorce’. Ibn Taymiyya and his contribution to various aspects
of Ḥanbalī legal discourse has been covered extensively in Chapter Four of this book;
however, due to the clamour surrounding this issue, Matroudi decided to devote a
chapter to its discussion, describing it as one of the ‘most signiﬁcant jurisprudential
issues in the life of Ibn Taymiyya’ (p. 171). Ibn Taymiyya clashed on the issue with
some of the leading jurists of his era, including revered Ḥanbalī jurists, who argued
that his legal opinion contravened the consensus among scholars, including the
famous eponyms of the four classical schools of jurisprudence. The arguments
concerning the ‘intended triple divorce’ were not concerned with the form of
annulment in which a husband would pronounce the divorce of his wife three times
separately and over three successive periods of waiting (ʿidda) without any
revocation: scholars had agreed that this form of divorce was binding (p. 172). The
points of contention surrounded the following types of divorce: (i) instances in which
the divorce was expressed three times in a single sitting, using the phrase anti ṭāliq
thalātha; (ii) instances in which the form of divorce was expressed using three
pronouncements in a single sitting such as ‘antī ṭāliq, antī ṭāliq, antī ṭāliq’; or ‘antī
ṭāliq wa-ṭāliq wa-ṭāliq’ in which either the wāw or the fāʾ was used as a conjunction;
and (iii) instances in which the divorce was pronounced at three different times,
but using the antī ṭāliq formula once only. Ibn Taymiyya claimed that while many
Ḥanbalī jurists accepted the view that these forms of ‘intended triple divorce’ were
prohibited and reprehensibly innovative, despite the fact that the narrations linked to
Ibn Ḥanbal appeared to be at variance, they recognised them as being legally
irrevocable34 and therefore binding. Ibn Taymiyya explained that such forms of triple
divorce carried the efﬁcacy of a single pronouncement and could not therefore be
binding. He was perplexed by the fact that certain Ḥanbalī scholars were prepared to
deem such procedures of divorce innovative and impermissible, yet they would still
maintain that they were legally binding (p. 174). In Ibn Taymiyya’s view this went
against the logic of dividing the forms of divorce into permissible and impermissible
types, and he swiftly dismissed the scriptural evidences adduced by his opponents,
arguing that a closer reading of the sources showed that the testimony they were citing
had been taken out of its proper context (p. 175).
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Examining the issue of whether Ibn Taymiyya’s position on this subject was in
opposition to the consensus of Ḥanbalī scholars, Matroudi notes that Ḥanbalī sources
suggested there was no disagreement regarding the issue within the school but that Ibn
Taymiyya had implied that some Ḥanbalī scholars had previously questioned the
efﬁcacy of the triple divorce. Matroudi looks at legal sources which date back to the
formative years of the Ḥanbalī tradition and later materials which follow in the wake
of Ibn Taymiyya’s intervention into the subject. He notes that in the masāʾil texts, Ibn
Ḥanbal adopts the view that the ‘intended triple divorce has the effect of three separate
divorces’; it was thus binding (p. 177). The school simply preserved this view. The
impression is that if disagreements did occur, then they were concerned with whether
such divorces could be classed as being innovative. Scholars still spoke of them being
binding, as the mukhtaṣar of al-Khiraqī shows, and indeed the commentary on this
text by Ibn al-Bannā (d. 471/1078); additionally, Ibn Qudāma’s ʿUmda does not refer
to there being any disagreement concerning the binding nature of the triple divorce
(p. 177). For Matroudi this poses the question of whether any Ḥanbalī scholars
actually subscribed to the view that the triple divorce was not binding. Ibn Taymiyya
does mention that his grandfather al-Majd did take this view, yet, as Matroudi rightly
concludes from his survey of the extant Ḥanbalī sources, this was not a view adopted
by any of the school’s luminaries. This leaves the inevitable question as to why Ibn
Taymiyya would claim that some Ḥanbalī scholars queried whether the intended triple
divorce was binding. Matroudi answers this in two ways: ﬁrstly, he suggests that it is
possible that Ibn Taymiyya was alluding to the view of his grandfather, although it
seems patently obvious that Ibn Taymiyya’s reference to a second camp implies that
he was invoking a body of earlier scholarship within the Ḥanbalī school. Secondly,
Matroudi assumes that Ibn Taymiyya was not referring to actual scholars who may
have held this opinion but rather to the hypothetical existence of counter-positions
sustained via elaborate referencing to Ibn Ḥanbal’s inferred principles of
jurisprudence (pp. 178–9). One would have to say that this argument is less than
convincing. Nonetheless, it is the case that Ibn Taymiyya did propose that Ibn
Ḥanbal’s view, which predicated that the intended triple divorce was prohibited yet
binding, did contravene the general legal principles applied by this individual. Ibn
Qayyim was to assert later on that given the seniority of Ibn Taymiyya within the
Ḥanbalī school, his qawl (legal ruling) on the issue can justiﬁably be considered as
one of the ofﬁcial positions of the school. Matroudi believes that Ibn Taymiyya was
vindicated in maintaining that it was incorrect to state that consensus existed among
all scholars regarding the binding nature of the triple divorce. Ibn Taymiyya was able
to adduce the statements of many jurists outside the Ḥanbalī school who equated the
triple divorce with a single pronouncement (p. 182). Matroudi sums up this chapter by
stating that Ibn Taymiyya’s contribution to the discourse on this subject had its impact
upon later attempts to resolve this point of law: subsequent scholars such as al-Ḥarīrī
(d. 803/1400), Jamāl al-Dīn al-Imām (d. 798/1396) and al-Dawālibī (d. 862/1458) all
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endorsed his view. Although the Ḥanbalī legal sources uphold the view that the
intended triple divorce ‘amounts to an irrevocable divorce’, a second opinion within
the school was highlighted: this was the view advocated by Ibn Taymiyya and those
who concurred with his reading of the sources. The issue of the intended triple divorce
and Ibn Taymiyya’s stance on this issue appositely encapsulate his traditionalist and
critical approach to jurisprudence. This remained one of the deﬁning features of his
contribution to Ḥanbalī juridical thought and legal discourse in general, overriding,
whenever necessary, token loyalties to one speciﬁc school of thought.
To sum up, this book will serve as a critical reference work for scholars and
researchers wishing to gauge the complexity of the legacy bequeathed by Ibn
Taymiyya to classical Ḥanbalī legal discourse. It provides unique insights into the
nature of this individual’s relationship with the Ḥanbalī school, showing that Ibn
Taymiyya adopted Ibn Ḥanbal’s jurisprudence and its applied methodology for the
basic reason that, in his judgement, they enshrined the most orthodox approach to the
interpretation of the law. Even in instances when he adopted positions which
conﬂicted with accepted legal opinions within the school, Ibn Taymiyya was able to
argue that the inferred uṣūl of Ibn Ḥanbal substantiated his judgement. This very fact
conﬁrms the distinctly traditionalist streak which marks Ibn Taymiyya’s legal and
indeed theological thought. Matroudi’s intimate knowledge and marshalling of the
legal sources from the periods he covers are authoritative, and this is evident in the
extensive range of legal themes and issues analysed in this book. His work is a
welcome contribution to the library of academic studies on Islamic law.
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28 See Abū Zahra’s review of a somewhat related discussion of theological issues in his Ibn
Taymiyya, pp. 228–9.
29 The practices of the Ṣūfīs who had encouraged ziyārāt (visitation) to the tombs of saints and
religious luminaries also concerned Ibn Taymiyya. See Abū Zahra’s argument in Ibn Taymiyya,
pp. 272–9.
30 Abū ʿAbd Allāh Shams al-Dīn ibn Qayyim, Ighāfat al-lahfān min maṣāʾid al-shayṭān,
ed. Ṭāhir ʿAbd al-Raʾūf (2 vols, Cairo: Fayṣal ʿĪsā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, n.d), vol. 1, pp. 211–52;
cf. Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm ibn Taymiyya, Iqtiḍā ṣirāt al-mustaqīm mukhālifa aṣḥāb al-
jahīm, ed. Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raʾūf Saʿd (Cairo: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Kutub al-ʿArabiyya, n.d.), pp. 282–405.
Even modern writers such as Abū Zahra, who was a defender and admirer of Ibn Taymiyya
disagreed with him on aspects of this issue. See Abū Zahra, Ibn Taymiyya, pp. 274–5.
31 See Abū Fidāʾ Ismāʿīl ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya wa’l-nihāya, ed. A. Mulḥim, A. ʿAṭwī,
F. Sayyid, M. Nāṣir al-Dīn and A. ʿAbd al-Sātir (8 vols, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya,
1986), vol. 8 (part 14), pp. 141–6. Also see his entry in Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī ibn Ḥajar ʿAsqalānī,
al-Durar al-kāmina fī aʿyān al-miʾa al-thāmina, ed. Muḥammad Sayyid Jād al-Ḥaqq (5 vols,
Dār al-Kutub al-Ḥadītha, 1966). vol. 1, pp. 154–70. See especially pp. 155–61.
32 This is a point which is apparent in the ensuing chapter, pp. 133–70.
33 One only needs to examine the issue of ‘who is permitted to imitate others in sharʿī rulings’
to gain a sense of Ibn Taymiyya’s position on mujhtahids and ijtihād (pp. 84–9).
34 See Muwaffaq al-Dīn Abū Muḥammad ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī fī ﬁqh al-imām Aḥmad ibn
Ḥanbal al-Shaybānī (13 vols, Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1985), vol. 7, pp. 277–85.
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Mufradat al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī. By Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥasan ibn ʿAlī ibn Ibrāhīm al-Ahwāzī.
Edited and introduced by ʿUmar Ḥamdān. Amman: Dār Ibn Kathīr, 1427/2006.
Pp. 617. List price not available.
Mufradat Ibn Muḥayṣin al-Makkī. By Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥasan ibn ʿAlī ibn Ibrāhīm
al-Ahwāzī. Edited and introduced by ʿUmar Ḥamdān. Amman: Dār Ibn Kathīr,
1428/2007. Pp. 447. List price not available.
The editing of manuscripts on the textual history of the Qur’an and the science of
variant readings (ʿilm al-qirāʾāt) has increased in the last few decades, providing
scholars with access to hitherto inaccessible material and ample opportunity for
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scholarly studies on the oral and textual transmission of the Qur’an. In this context,
Omar Hamdan’s recent editions of al-Ahwāzī’s Mufradat al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī and
Mufradat Ibn Muḥayṣin al-Makkī are most appreciated and worthy of notice. Since
Hamdan gives the same account of al-Ahwāzī in the two edited texts, both of which
are written by the same author (al-Ahwāzī) and have been edited by the same editor
(Hamdan), I will discuss ﬁrst the editor’s account of al-Ahwāzī, included in his
introduction to both editions (with some minor differences), before moving on to
discuss his treatment of Mufradat al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī and Mufradat Ibn Muḥayṣin
al-Makkī, and concluding with a look at the manuscript used for both editions.
Referring to diverse historical and qirāʾāt sources, the editor offers an almost identical
biography of the author al-Ahwāzī (d. 446/1055) in both volumes, including an
extensive account of his contribution to the science of Qur’anic variant readings, his
travels to centres of Qur’anic scholarship, his scholarly character and reputation,
his students and the dissemination of his teachings. In addition, Hamdan provides
a list of al-Ahwāzī’s works. These works – mostly on qirāʾāt, but including other
topics as well – amount to sixteen texts, some published, others only extant as
manuscript, and others still lost or unidentiﬁed. Among these cited works are
Mufradat al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī and Mufradat Ibn Muḥayṣin al-Makkī, of which an
edition is provided in the two books under review here, which contain the readings of
the two respective readers arranged according to the order of the suras in the muṣḥaf.
Both mufradāt contain instances which are reported to have differed from the
canonical reading of Abū ʿAmr ibn al-ʿAlāʾ al-Baṣrī (d. 154/771), one of the seven
Qur’an readers. Hence the title ‘mufrada’: works dedicated to individual Qur’an
readers.
The Mufradat al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī comprises two parts, the ﬁrst of which contains three
sections. Sections One and Two are extensive biographies, the ﬁrst of the author
al-Ahwāzī (pp. 9–104) and the second (pp. 105–80) of the Qur’an reader in question,
al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (d. 110/728). Section Three is a description of the edited manuscript
(pp. 181–94). Part Two is an annotated and thorough edition of Mufradat al-Ḥasan
al-Baṣrī (pp. 195–573). The text is supplemented by four useful indices, and is
generally free of print errors.
Al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī is one of the earliest and most renowned readers of the Qur’an, and
is included among the famous fourteen Qur’an readers. Born in Medina during the
caliphate of ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb (d. 23/644), al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī met and learned from
many of the Prophet’s companions and later became one of the founding ﬁgures of
Islamic tradition. In his introduction to this ﬁgure, Hamdan offers an extensive
account of his life and legacy. After providing a list of the biographical accounts and
contemporary studies (in Arabic and in European languages) about him (pp. 112–17),
the editor then proceeds to give a lengthy description of his scholarly contributions,
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arranged according to subject. These subjects include his qirāʾa (pp. 117–20) and his
exegetical output (pp. 120–5). We are informed that al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī’s reading is
primarily known to us through tafsīr and philological works, and is scattered
throughout the qirāʾāt literature. We are fortunate, however, to have available an
edition of the Mufradat al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī compiled by al-Ahwāzī, which is a work
dedicated solely to the reading preferences of al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī arranged according to
the order of the suras in the muṣḥaf. Concerning his exegetical activity, the editor
draws our attention to the abundant number of riwāyāt attributed to al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī
in the tafsīr sources and the need for a critical study of these riwāyāt. The introduction
also treats brieﬂy his Ḥadīth activities and (pp. 126–8) mentions some of the
problematic issues related to his transmission of Ḥadīth, such as his tadlīs
(concealment of the name of a transmitter or source in an isnād) and irsāl (the
omission of the transmitter between a successor and the Prophet in an isnād). Other
topics addressed in the introduction include a list of recent studies about his legal
contributions (pp. 129–30), his asceticism (zuhd) (pp. 131–3), his theological ideas
(pp. 133–6), his mastery of the Arabic language and his eloquence in speech (faṣāḥa)
(pp. 138–44).
In addition, the editor treats the isnād of al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī’s reading, upon which
al-Ahwāzī depends. Dividing the isnād into two parts – one linking al-Ahwāzī
to al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (containing three transmitters) and the second linking al-Ḥasan
al-Baṣrī to the Prophet (containing two transmitters) – the editor gives a valuable
account of each transmitter and his place in the qirāʾāt literature (pp. 151–65). His
examination of the isnād is followed by a section in which the editor introduces the
teachers and students of al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (pp. 165–72), providing material for future
studies about the scholarly communities and networks in which al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī
contributed. Lastly, the editor discusses the so-called Muṣḥaf al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, the
alleged codex attributed to him (currently held in Istanbul) and cites reasons why it is
inauthentic (pp. 172–6).
The Mufradat Ibn Muḥayṣin al-Makkī comprises two parts, the ﬁrst of which contains
three sections. Sections One and Two are extensive biographies, the ﬁrst, again, of the
author al-Ahwāzī (pp. 9–100) and the second (pp. 101–78) of the Qur’an reader in
question, Ibn Muḥayṣin al-Makkī (d. 123/741). Section Three is a description of the
edited manuscript (pp. 179–90). Part Two of the book is an annotated and thorough
edition of Mufradat Ibn Muḥayṣin al-Makkī (pp. 191–405). As with the edition of
Mufradat al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, the text is supplemented by four useful indices, and is
generally free of print errors.
Although Ibn Muḥayṣin was a prominent reader in the late ﬁrst century and beginning
of the second century, he nevertheless hardly appears in later sources. His absence
from the sources has meant that not a great deal of attention has been paid to his
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contributions to the qirāʾāt, despite the fact that he was a prominent reader and came
from an important centre of learning, Mecca. Hamdan provides a philologically
erudite investigation of the confusion around his name found in the sources (pp. 102–
14), followed by an account of the scholarly generation to which he belonged, which
included such ﬁgures as Ibn Kathīr, Ḥumayd ibn Qays al-Aʿraj, al-Aʿsam and Yazīd
al-Barbarī, the former being the oldest and most esteemed (pp. 114–19), and a
discussion of his excellence in Arabic (pp. 119–21). Following this the editor
investigates the reasons behind the marginalisation of Ibn Muḥayṣin’s reading. The
primary reason, according to Hamdan, is that Ibn Mujāhid (d. 324/936) did not
include it in his famous Seven Readings but rendered it uncanonical (shādhdha), and
thus Ibn Muḥayṣin’s reading was neither recited nor transmitted. Ibn Mujāhid’s
position toward Ibn Muḥayṣin’s reading was generally accepted by the majority of
later scholars, many of whom marginalised it, while some included it in their
collections of uncanonical readings (such as Ibn Jinnī (d. 392/1002) in his
al-Muḥtasab ﬁ’l-shawādhdh). However, as Hamdan points out, several scholars
defended Ibn Muḥayṣin’s reading, such as al-Andarābī (d. after 500/1107) in his Kitāb
al-īḍāḥ fī’l-qirāʾāt. Some even attempted to establish the transmission of Ibn
Muḥayṣin’s reading; these included Abū ʿAlī al-Mālikī (d. 438/1047) in his al-Rawḍa,
al-Ahwāzī (d. 446/1055) in his Mufrada, and Sibṭ al-Khayyāṭ (d. 541/1146) in his
al-Mubhij. The great interest in the reading of Ibn Muḥayṣin which arose in the
centuries following Ibn Mujāhid’s Kitāb al-sabʿa and consequently led to a wave of
qirāʾāt works which included Ibn Muḥayṣin’s reading in the qirāʾāt literature was
most probably a reaction from those scholars who rejected the marginalisation of Ibn
Muḥayṣin’s reading due to Ibn Mujāhid’s favoured seven. The author’s exploration
of the reception of Ibn Muḥayṣin’s reading is elaborate and well-documented
(pp. 121–44).
As with the Mufradat al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, the isnād of the reading of Ibn Muḥayṣin is
examined by giving an account of each transmitter according to the available literature
(pp. 144–53). This is followed by a listing of his teachers (p. 153) and students
(pp. 154–63), which is certainly useful for any prosopographical analysis of the
reader’s scholarly community. In comparison to Ibn Makkī’s acknowledged
engagement in the qirāʾāt, his Ḥadīth activity is however meagre. The editor
manages to ﬁnd only six ḥādīths in the available sources which mention his
participation in their transmission (pp. 163–76). The tafsīr reports attributed to him are
similarly scanty (pace Hamdan, only two, see p. 176).
Both texts under review here are based on the same manuscript authored by al-Ahwāzī
himself, and housed in the Arabic manuscript collection at the al-Aqṣā mosque in
Jerusalem (31–70–1: ʿUlūm Qurʾān – Mufradat Ibn Muḥayṣin; 28–70–2: ʿUlūm
Qurʾān – Mufradat al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī). As Hamdan was unable to ﬁnd any copies
of this text in the available manuscript catalogues, he has had to rely solely on the
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al-Aqṣā Mosque manuscripts for his editions. The edited text is equipped with an
apparatus in the margin which contains references to verse enumeration, Qur’anic
readings, Ḥadīth material and discussions in the tafsīr literature, making the edition a
rich source for further comparative work. And, to make up for the absence of
additional manuscripts with which to collate the al-Aqṣā Mosque manuscript, the
editor compares what is known from other sources about the readings of Ibn
Muḥayṣin and al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī with al-Ahwāzī’s text in the marginal footnotes. Each
volume is supplemented by several useful indices (e.g. names of persons mentioned in
the text, instances of agreement between the readers in question, Arabic sources, and
non-Arabic sources used for the edition).
If there were to be a criticism of these editions, it would concern their separate
publication. I would have liked to see both texts printed together in two volumes as
this is how they were found in the manuscript used for the edition and this was
perhaps the original intention of the author, al-Ahwāzī. However, this preference does
not have an effect either on the merits of these editions or on the efforts exerted by the
editor. The value of these books lies in their importance for researchers of Qur’anic
studies, Arabic linguistics, and dialectology. With recent growing interest in the
textual history of the Qur’an, these editions are without a doubt a valuable
contribution to the ﬁeld.
ISLAM DAYEH
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The Qurʾan: An Encyclopedia. Edited by Oliver Leaman. London and New York:
Routledge, 2006. Pp. xxv+771. £125.
The Blackwell Companion to the Qurʾān. Edited by Andrew Rippin. Blackwell
Companions to Religion. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006. Pp. xiii+560.
£85.00.
These two works, both of which are intended as introductory companions to the
Qur’an and its interpretation, state similar aims on their ﬂyleaves: of making the
Qur’an accessible to ‘anyone who wishes to read and understand the Qurʾān as a
text and a vital piece of Muslim life’ (The Blackwell Companion), and presenting
‘a powerful one-volume resource covering all aspects of the text and its reception’
(The Qurʾan). However, within the stated boundaries of providing a compendium that
is aimed primarily at the non-specialist reader (The Blackwell Companion states that it
includes an initial section designed for the ‘ﬁrst-time reader’ and The Qurʾan that it
‘assumes no previous knowledge of the Qurʾan, Islam or Arabic’), they differ quite
signiﬁcantly in approach and content.
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The Blackwell Companion presents a compendium of thirty essays divided into ﬁve
sections, accompanied by a general bibliography, an ‘Index of People, Places and
Topics’ and an ‘Index of Qur’an Verses’. The ﬁrst section, ‘Orientation’, consists of
three essays (‘Introducing’ by Tamara Sonn, ‘Discovering’ by Christopher Buck, and
‘Contextualising’ by Abdullah Saeed) which are intended as general introductions to
the Qur’an and its reception. These ﬁrst three chapters are indeed introductory,
however they provide a comprehensive, if at times necessarily simpliﬁed, overview
and the references included in the ‘Further Reading’ section that concludes each
chapter cover a generally pertinent representation of recent academic approaches (for
example, in the initial article by Tamara Sonn readers are referred to works by
Mawdudi, Wansbrough, Izutsu, Cragg, Fazlur Rahman and Montgomery Watt).
Part II, ‘Text’, includes ten essays on ‘Linguistic Structure’ (Salwa M.S. El-Awa);
‘Patterns of Address’ (Rosalind Ward Gwynne); ‘Language’ (Mustansir Mir);
‘Poetry and Language’ (Navid Kermani); ‘Foreign Vocabulary’ (Michael Carter);
‘Structure and the Emergence of Community’ (Angelika Neuwirth); ‘Sacrality and
Collection’ (Aliza Shnizer); ‘Written Transmission’ (François Déroche); ‘Context:
Muḥammad’ (Herbert Berg); and ‘Context: ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb’ (Avraham Hakim).
As should be evident from the titles alone, the ﬁrst ﬁve chapters in this section all
deal with the physical aspects of the Qur’anic text itself, while the latter ﬁve discuss
the reception of the Qur’an, its status as a sacred Book, and its arrangement and
transmission.
As Rippin himself comments in his preface, the choice of material in Part III
(‘Content’) initially seems to be rather eclectic: ‘God’ by Andrew Rippin and
‘Prophets and Prophethood’ by Uri Rubin seem completely logical, as does the
inclusion of ‘Moses’ by Brannon Wheeler. ‘Argumentation’ (Kate Zebiri), ‘Knowing
and Thinking’ (A.H. Mathias Zahniser), ‘Sex, Sexuality and the Family’ (Khaleel
Mohammed) and ‘Jihād’ (Reuven Firestone) are not necessarily such straightforward
choices, but do deal with some of the prevalent issues under general discussion today,
and (as Rippin points out) relate to key concepts integral to an understanding of the
Qur’anic message. Part IV, ‘Interpretation’, likewise, could be accused of not providing
as exhaustive a treatment as it might of the issue at hand, but there is a clear progression
to the chapters: ‘Hermeneutics: al-Thaʿlabī’ by Walid Saleh, ‘Stories of the Prophets’
byMarianna Klar, ‘Ṣūﬁsm’ by Alan Godlas, ‘Rūmī’ by JawidMojaddedi, and ‘Twelver
Shīʿī Taʾwīl’ and ‘Ismāʿīlī Taʾwīl’ both by Diana Steigerwald. The contents of the
ﬁnal section, Part V ‘Application’ (‘Exegetical Sciences’ by Jane Dammen McAuliffe;
‘Theology’ by Binyamin Abrahamov; ‘Jurisprudence’ by A. Kevin Reinhart;
‘Contemporary Ethical Issues’ by Leah Kinberg; ‘Narrative Literature’ by Roberto
Tottoli; and ‘Recitation’ by Anna M. Gade) however, seem an entirely logical
progression in the overall discussion of the Qur’anic text.
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As may be clear from the brief survey of contents above, although the initial chapters
are intentionally introductory, many of the later essays are pitched at a more complex
level. The production values are high, and the volume is well presented.
In contrast to the chapter format of The Blackwell Companion, The Qurʾan: An
Encyclopedia takes (not altogether surprisingly, given its title), encyclopaedic form.
Intended to bridge the gap between the ‘highly scholarly’ and ‘rather skimpy
elementary books’ (p. ix), The Qurʾan comprises around 350 entries. While there are
contributions from some 43 scholars, intended according to the introduction to
provide comparing and contrasting views from varied backgrounds and persuasions, a
number of authors have contributed particularly: most notably the editor himself,
Raﬁk Berjak, Brannon Wheeler, Nevad Kahteran, Stefan Wild and Colin Turner have
all written multiple entries. In addition to an alphabetic listing of entries, name, and
subject indices, the main body of the text is, as with The Blackwell Companion,
supplemented with a general bibliography and a ‘Qur’anic Passages Index’. (The two
volumes also share a number of common authors: Tamara Sonn provides entries here
on ‘ASBAB AL-NUZUL’, ‘CALENDAR’, ‘COMPANIONS OF THE CAVE’,
‘PARENTS’ and ‘TAQLID’; Andrew Rippin on ‘CYBERSPACE AND THE
QURʾAN’, ‘HALAL/AHALLA’, ‘HARRAM/HARRAMA’ and ‘WASWAS’; Marianna
Klar on ‘DREAMS’ and ‘ʿISM/ʿISMA’; Abdullah Saeed on ‘REVELATION’, ‘RIBA’
and ‘RIDDA AND THE CASE FOR DECRIMINALIZATION OF APOSTASY’; and
Brannon Wheeler on ‘ʿAD’, ‘ADAM’, ‘ASBAT’, ‘AYYUB’, ‘DAWUD/DAʾUD’,
‘DHU AL-KIFL’, ‘DHU AL-QARNAYN’, ‘ELISHA’, ‘HARUN’, ‘HUD’, ‘IBRA-
HIM’, ‘IDRIS’, ‘ISMAʿIL’, ‘ISRAʾILIYYAT’, ‘JALUT’, ‘LUT’ (but not ‘LUT’S
WIFE’ which has a separate entry by Kecia Ali), ‘MUSA’ (likewise, there is a
separate entry for Moses’ mother and sister by Kecia Ali), ‘NUH’, ‘SALIH’,
‘SULAYMAN’, ‘TABUT’, ‘TALUT’, ‘TUBBA’,‘ʿUZAYR’, ‘YAʾJUJ WA
MAʾJUJ’ and ‘YUNUS’.) In terms of subject matter, entries generally (but not
exhaustively) fall into various categories: those dealing with signiﬁcant exegetes
(‘AHMAD B. HANBAL’, ‘MAWDUDI, SAYYID ABUL AʿLA’, ‘SAYYID
QUTB’), personages (‘HARUN’, ‘MUHAMMAD’,‘ʿALI IBN ABI TALIB’) and
places and events (‘GHADIR KHUMM’, ‘BADR’), speciﬁc issues (‘SCIENCE AND
THE QUR’AN’), terminology and words (‘KALAM/KALIMA/KALLAMA’, ‘NASKH’,
‘MATA’), aspects of the muṣḥaf (‘LANGUAGE AND THE QURʾAN’, ‘MECCAN
AND MEDINAN SURAS AND THE QURʾAN’) and discussion of Qur’anic and
wider Islamic concepts (‘MANSLAUGHTER’, ‘SABR’, ‘ʿISHQ’).
While entries are relatively brief, the length can vary widely – for example ‘MATA’
(p. 395) has an entry of sixteen lines, and ‘JIHAD/JAHADA’ twenty (although this
latter entry is cross-referenced to ‘QITAL’ (p. 520) and ‘WAR AND VIOLENCE’
(pp. 686–92), also by Asma Afsaruddin), while ‘TRANSLATION AND THE
QURʾAN’ (pp. 657–70), and ‘MUHAMMAD’ (pp. 419–28) have a much more
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lengthy and detailed exposition. Furthermore, although there is a general
bibliography, many entries also include references for further reading and/or cross
references to related entries.
In terms of presentation, The Qurʾan contains a number of typographical errors – for
example p. xii cites BSOAS as an abbreviation for the Bulletin of the School of Asian
and African Studies, as opposed to the School of Oriental and African Studies, and the
entry for ‘ABU BAKR’ (p. 7) has ‘isra’Atiq’ apparently as one word and missing
the hamza – and editorial inconsistencies, such as the fact that (on p. 8) ‘qiraʾat’ in
the entry for ‘ABU HANIFA, NUMAN B. SABIT’ is not glossed while ‘raʾy’ and
‘qiyas’ are (although there is an entry for ‘QIRAʾAT’, this is a cross-reference which
refers the reader to entries for ‘HAFIZ’ and ‘INIMITABILITY’). We also have, for
example, ‘ʿALI IBN ABI TALIB’ but ‘AL-NAJJAR, AL-HUSAYN B. MUHAM-
MAD’, and ‘DHU AL-QARNAYN’ but ‘ABU’L HUDAYL AL-ʿALLAF’.
Furthermore, it is not entirely clear why some entries have not been integrated –
for example ‘ABU LAHAB’ and ‘ABU LAHAB’S SIGNIFICANCE’ would seem to
be better combined into a single entry.
Beyond the obvious differences in approach and content, The Blackwell Companion
and The Qurʾan also seem to vary in their editorial agenda – although Leaman’s
introduction to The Qurʾan is very brief, it is noticeable that he focuses on the issue of
religious background in setting out his vision for this volume, making the point that
‘contributors to this volume come from a wide variety of backgrounds. Some are
Muslims, some are not, and some have no religious beliefs whatsoever… The authors
come from all doctrinal backgrounds and readers should expect to ﬁnd a wide variety
of views in this book … What this volume represents is very much interpretation and
commentary, tafsir in Arabic, an attempt at understanding the text of the Qur’an’
(p. ix). This, in addition to the inclusion of the quotation Peace to all who follow
guidance (Q. 20:47) in the title pages somehow gives the impression that this is a
work which is trying to cater to the interested faithful as well as to the outsider (the
ﬂyleaf refers to the current ‘public debate’ about the Qur’an, much of which is not
based in ‘knowledge and understanding of the book’) and this appears to be carried
through in some of the entries. For example, the entry on ‘EDUCATION AND THE
QURʾAN’ seems to be more a discussion of the perceptions of conﬂict between
‘secular’ and ‘religious’ education in the here and now which contrasts ‘Western’
modes of learning with ‘Islamic’ traditions of education than of, for example, the
impact of the Qur’an on education past and present, or an outline of what a Qur’anic
education is. This focus on modern ‘popular’ issues and concerns presumably also lies
behind the choice of entries such as ‘RIDDA AND THE CASE FOR DECRIMINA-
LIZATION OF APOSTASY’ and its related entry for ‘RADD/IRTIDAD AND THE
JUSTIFICATION OF THE CRIMINALIZATION OF APOSTASY’. In contrast, The
Blackwell Companion presents itself squarely in the mould of the American and
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European academic tradition of Qur’anic Studies, but positions itself as addressing an
audience ‘who may have little exposure to the Qurʾān beyond a curiosity evoked by
the popular media’ (p. x): Chapter Two makes this very explicit in its discussion of
why ‘the Qurʾān can and should be taught in the university’ (p. 20), an essay which
advances the idea that the Qur’an ‘is required reading for religious, political, cultural
and global literacy … a democratic as well as academic exercise’ (p. 34–5).
In short, these works appear to be designed with very different criteria in mind. This is
perhaps most obviously noticeable in the different ways in which they tackle issues of
transliteration: The Qurʾan eschews transliteration completely (with the exception of
hamza and ʿayn) while The Blackwell Companion contains full transliteration. While
both are companion volumes that ﬁll gaps in the literature currently available, The
Qurʾan will for the most part be useful as a quick reference tool for the general reader,
and The Blackwell Companion is a well-considered set of articles that, although taking
a more academic approach, remains accessible.
HELEN BLATHERWICK
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The Cosmos of Arabic Calligraphy: The Works of Fuad Kouichi Honda.
By Kouichi Honda. Tokyo: Hakusuisha, 2006. Pp. 149. ¥ 9800+tax.
Prior to the publication of this work, only two other major works on Arabic
calligraphy have been published in Japan: Anmāṭ al-khaṭṭ al-ʿArabī and The Art of
Islamic Calligraphy.1 The former was edited by Sagenji Yoshida, a Japanese Muslim
born in 1925 who studied Islamic design in Egypt, Italy and France as an overseas
research employee of the Ministry of Education between 1970 and 1971.2 This book,
published in 1975, includes about twenty pieces of calligraphic works created by the
author, a brief explanation of Islam, the history of the Arabic alphabet, an introduction
to the styles of Arabic calligraphy, and discussions of works by Arab calligraphers. As
for the author’s pieces presented in this volume, most of these are composed with a
brush, rather than the traditional pen. Furthermore, Yoshida carved out his own artistic
niche in that the shaping of his letters takes different forms to the traditionally deﬁned
modes of Arabic calligraphy. The Art of Islamic Calligraphy is a full translation of
Fann al-khaṭṭ published by the Research Centre for Islamic History (IRCICA) in
Istanbul.3 In addition to the translation itself, which introduces the history of Arabic
calligraphy and presents 192 works with commentary, the translator, Kouichi Honda,
includes separate sections in which he gives explanations of the various forms of
Arabic calligraphy, relevant technical terms, and a brief introduction to major aspects
of Islam, Arabic grammar and so on.
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While the above-mentioned books mainly introduced works by Arab calligraphers, the
work under review here, The Cosmos of Arabic Calligraphy, comprises a collection of
35 large works (including his ijāza, on which he wrote the basmala) and 10 smaller
pieces by the Japanese calligrapher, Kouichi Honda. Honda is currently professor at
Daito Bunka University (Japan) where he teaches Arabic, and is also the president of
the Japan Arabic Calligraphy Association (JACA) founded in 2006.4 He has
previously written several Arabic primers on the Arabic alphabet and language, in
addition to an Arabic-Japanese dictionary and a Japanese-Arabic Dictionary.5 In The
Cosmos of Arabic Calligraphy he sets out to outline the history of Arabic calligraphy,
and its tools. The text is accompanied by illustrative photographs, and he provides
samples of the eight calligraphic styles (giving the basmala in naskh, thuluth, ruqʿa,
dīwānī, Fārisī, jarī dīwānī, Ḥijāzī and Kūfī styles/scripts, each composed in his own
hand) in addition to a table which presents each of the letters of the Arabic alphabet,
likewise in each of the eight scripts.
Fuad Kouichi Honda has followed an intriguing path to his realisation of his interest in
Arabic calligraphy. Born in Tokyo in 1946, he majored in Arabic language at the
Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, following which he went to Saudi Arabia as an
interpreter and coordinator for a Japanese ﬁrm making maps for the Kingdom’s
Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources. Whilst there, he came across Arabic
calligraphy, and when he saw a Saudi Arabian scribe writing place-names on a blank
map, asked him for instruction and began to study calligraphy with him every night
after work. On his return to Japan he continued to pursue this interest in calligraphy,
and, in 1990, was awarded an encouragement prize by the jury of the Second
International Arabic Calligraphy Contest in Turkey. In 1996, he was chosen as one of
the world’s top ﬁve contemporary Arabic calligraphers at a Kuwaiti government
festival. Then, in 2000, Hassan Chelebi, a Turkish master, whose private instruction
by correspondence he took for twelve years, awarded Honda an ijāza in Arabic
calligraphy.
Honda’s identifying signature is that he cuts off tadhhīb (illumination), that is,
geometric design, ﬂoral design or arabesque design around the letters, in order to
bring the beauty of each letter to the fore: according to him the Arabic letters do not
need any illumination around them as their beauty is intrinsic in their form. His works
are groundbreaking from this point of view, although when he writes letters he never
departs from the strict traditional rules of Arabic calligraphy, a form which has already
been developed to sophistication. The pieces included in the book, the majority of
which are Qur’anic verses, demonstrate his particular approach. For example, in the
ﬁrst piece entitled ‘Blue Desert’ he depicts all the ayas of Sūrat Luqmān which
describe the Creation (i.e. Q. 31:10, He created the heavens without any visible
support, and He placed ﬁrm mountains on the earth – in case it should shake under
you – and He spread all kinds of animals around it. We sent down water from the sky,
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with which We made every kind of good plant grow)6 in surging blue sand waves. The
second and third pieces are ‘Nebula of Letters’ 1 and 2 which express Q. 24:35–46
and Q. 40:57–67 respectively. In these, ayas such as God is the Light of the heavens
and earth (Q. 24:35) or The creation of the heavens and earth is greater by far than
the creation of mankind, though most people do not know it (Q. 40:57) ﬂow in whirls
in the dark silent cosmos. ‘The Face of God’ 1, 2 and 3 (all of which are owned by the
British Museum) are acute isosceles triangles, formed as if to pierce the heavens,
within which the text of Qur’anic ayas are inscribed, including Q. 2:115, the East and
the West belong to God: wherever you turn, there is His Face. God is all pervading
and all knowing; Q. 28:88, … there is no god but Him. Everything will perish except
His Face. His is the Judgement and to Him you shall all be brought back’; and
Q. 55:26–7, everyone on earth perishes, all that remains is the Face of your Lord, full
of majesty, bestowing honour.
The majority of the book is authored in Japanese, however translations for the piece
titles and information regarding the ayas are provided in both English and Arabic, as
are individual chapter titles and Honda’s biography. In addition to this, his essay ‘The
Arts of Arabic Calligraphy and Me’ is made available to the English reader in
translation, as is an Arabic introduction entitled ‘ʿIndamā yafraḥ al-alwān’ penned by
one of his friends. Also included is an English introduction, ‘The Calligraphy of Fuad
Honda’. I hope therefore that non-Japanese speaking readers will take this book into
their hands and discover Honda’s artistic world for themselves.
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NOTES
1 Sagenji Yoshida, Arabia-Moji no Bi (Anmāṭ al-khaṭṭ al-ʿArabī) (Tokyo: Japan Muslim
Association, 1975); Kouichi Honda, ed., tr. and comment., Isuramu Shodō Gējutsu Taikan
(Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1996).
2 Prior to this he graduated from Tokyo Fine Arts School in 1947, and rejoined as staff in 1949.
3 Fann al-khaṭṭ (Istanbul: The Research Centre for Islamic History, 1990).
4 Its website ‘The world of Arabic calligraphy’ can be found at http://alqalam.jp, but is only in
Japanese.
5 Kouichi Honda and Tadaaki Ishiguro (eds), Pasupōto Shokyū Arabiago Jiten (Tokyo:
Hakusuisha, 1997); Kouichi Honda and Ehab Ahmad Ebeid (eds), Pasupōto Nihongo-Arabiago
Jiten (Tokyo: Hakusuisha, 2004).
6 All translations of the Qur’anic ayas rely on M.A.S. Abdel Haleem, The Qur’an: A New
Translation by M. A. S. Abdel Haleem (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
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